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Determining suppliers of public goods and services through ‘best value’ considerations has 
emerged as a viable alternative to market-based mechanisms that tended to rely on lowest 
cost. This type of procurement process has thereby enabled a focus on value-adding activities 
that may deliver innovative delivery mechanisms or services. Improved occupational health 
and safety (OHS) performance, through these ‘extra-market’ mechanisms, has become a 
salient issue in an Australian (and indeed global) industry context. In particular, the notion of 
selecting contractors according to their ability to deliver sound OHS outcomes has been given 
increasing attention in the scholarly literature and by forward-thinking clients. This approach 
reflects contemporary public values relating to the expectation that paid work should not 
involve preventable injuries or fatalities and should offer a working environment that 
encourages more than a minimalist approach to safety. As the internal labour market of 
public services is externalized and previous in-house regulations and safeguards are no 
longer in force, ways of achieving safe work practices through procurement regimes need to 
be advanced. The premise is that public infrastructure provision through private contracts 
should encourage safe occupational practices. 
 
 
1. Introduction and contextual overview 
 
The Australian construction industry has long been regarded as having an unacceptable 
occupational health and safety (OHS) record (Cole, 2003; Lingard and Rowlinson, 2005; 
Wild, 2005). Studies in other nations have provided comparable nations (e.g., Alves Dias, 
1995; Suraji et al., 2001). As a result, improving safety on-site has emerged as a matter of 
great concern, especially for government agencies and regulatory authorities. Since the 
inherent hazards of on-site construction work make construction workers highly vulnerable, 
safety, it follows, should be regarded as one of the most salient public values, and one which 
needs to be taken into account when decisions are made with regard to the procurement of 
infrastructure. This is especially pertinent to public sector clients. Yet other public values 
currently appear to militate against worker safety being given the importance that it should 
warrant. 
This paper, which draws upon qualitative data from an Australian research project 
focussing on the development of a voluntary code of practice for construction industry OHS 
commissioned by Engineers Australia and supported by a variety of peak organizations,1 
contends that improved OHS is now increasingly seen as a public value in construction 
procurement. However, other public values, it stands to reason, must also necessarily be 
considered when contracts are awarded for publicly-funded or subsidized projects. In light of 
this, it is argued that public sector decision-makers are under increasing pressure to balance 
                                                 
1 In particular, the Australian Contractors’ Association, Property Council of Australia, Royal Australian 
Institute of Architects, Association of Consulting Engineers Australia, Australian Procurement and Construction 
Council, Master Builders Australia and the CRC for Construction Innovation. 
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improved OHS performance (at least beyond what is currently stipulated by law or 
regulation), with a variety of other public values, including value for money, feasible cost, 
timely completion, suitability for purpose, and public accountability. 
Public value trade-offs are particularly pertinent in relation to public-private partnership 
(PPP), whereby arrangements are made that serve the interests of both the private sector and 
government (van Ham and Koppenjan, 2001; Hodge and Greve, 2005; Jefferies, 2006). PPPs 
are perceived by Australian governments, in addition to those of many OECD nations, to be 
the most cost-effective delivery method for procuring public infrastructure (Duffield, 2001). 
Of the various forms, private finance initiatives (PFIs) are the most common specific means to 
secure funding in a construction industry environment (Pitt et al., 2006). According to these 
arrangements, government takes advantage of private sector management skills, while private 
resources rather than solely public monies are put at risk. As Bovaird (2004) suggests, this 
kind of relationship goes far beyond a simple mutual agreement and, in many cases, refers to 
transferring responsibilities, especially with regard to the more problematic infrastructure-
based services expected by the general public. These partnerships aim to provide high levels 
of transparency in order to assure competitiveness and value for money (Pitt et al., 2006), and 
also require the building of strong relationships across the sectors involved in order to 
engender trust and reciprocity (Acar and Robertson, 2004). This creation of trust is contingent 
on mutal agreement regarding which public values are most pertinent to the successful 
completion of the project (Moore, 1995). In the case of most PPPs, however, the most salient 
of the public values incorporated into the decision-making process is ‘best value’ (Zhang, 
2006), to the exclusion of safety for those involved in project delivery. 
In PPP arrangements, public and commercial project objectives, especially in view of the 
rent-seeking activities of the latter, may not be entirely compatible, which entails the necessity 
of safeguarding mechanisms. Indeed, El-Higzi (2002) points out that the most important long-
term objectives of any company are survival and growth. In view of this, there is the potential 
for tensions to emerge between more traditional economic-centred and performance-based 
public values and improved OHS performance. This paper will discuss the political and 
public-values context in which public infrastructure decision-making is made, the degree to 
which trade-offs are made in the decision-making process, and the compatibility of improved 
OHS with other public values. The paper concludes by presenting a set of recommendations 
for balancing improved OHS performance expectations with other publicly-held values. 
 
 
2. Public values in public infrastructure procurement 
 
As stated above, the externalization of the provision of major infrastructure by public sector 
agencies raises many questions with regard to ensuring that public value expectations are met 
during the selection, design and execution fazes of an infrastructure project destined for 
public use. This viewpoint also pertains, by extension, to private sector clients delivering 
infrastructure once provided and operated by government. Of especial interest are cases where 
infrastructure intended for public use is provided by a privatized entity. Indeed, since many 
public amenities once owned and operated by government have been transferred to the private 
sector (Schipke, 2001; Zohlnhöfer and Obinger, 2006), amplification of such infrastructures 
still broadly falls under the rubric of public infrastructure provision. This means that 
government, being expected to deliver the public values inherent in such infrastructures (De 
Bruijn and Dicke, 2006), should concern itself with ensuring that activities relating to these 
infrastructures are aligned with broader public value expectations. 
Thus the public value of safety, i.e., that workers have the right to carry out their paid 
duties without incidence off death or debilitating injury, emerges as an especially important 
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value. Indeed, under Australian law, employers have a duty of care to provide their workers 
with a safe workplace. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Victoria (1992) has determined that “one 
of the chief responsibilities of all employers is the safety of those who work for them.” Such a 
duty has been held by Australian courts to apply not only to direct employees of a firm, but 
also to a firm’s subcontractors (Rozen, 2004). No culpability, however, has yet been assigned 
to a client for failing to ensure worker safety, even though recent literature suggests that 
subcontractors should be regarded as being employed by the client rather than principal 
contractors (Arditi and Chotibhongs, 2006). These considerations emerge as especially 
important when it is considered that roughly 80 per cent of contract expenditure in OECD 
nations relates to subcontracting (Packham et al., 2001). 
That on-site safety has become a public expectation, in much the same way as long-term 
sustainability and environmental protection, is clearly demonstrated by the efforts being made 
by various levels of government to improve the OHS record of the Australian construction 
industry (Royal Commission into the Building and Construction Industry, 2002). The media, 
it might be argued, has also played a part with regard to exposing the inadequate attention 
traditionally paid to worker safety on construction sites, something which has allowed the 
issue of worker safety to take on mainstream importance in contemporary discourses on work 
and public values. 
Problems, however, emerge when it comes to realizing the public value of worker safety. 
Indeed, this public value, in addition to long-term sustainability and environmental protection, 
have traditionally tended to lose their salience when they clash with more thoroughly 
embedded public values such as reasonable cost, timeliness of completion and quality (Jones 
et al., 2006). Yet the rising acceptance of corporate social responsibility (CSR), according to 
which firms need to realize the potential impact that their activities have on the environment, 
their workers, and society as a whole, has prompted forward-thinking firms to come to the 
realization that value need not only be represented in terms of project-specific income, or 
savings realized (Pitt et al. 2006). Rather, the concept of value relies on overall standards of 
quality measured according to a variety of criteria. ‘Value for money’, moreover, should not 
be at the expense of the safety of employees employed by the principal contractor. 
Unfortunately, there has traditionally been a lack of concern, in Australia, with regard to 
attention being paid to public concerns such as pollution, waste, noise and safety (Smith and 
Love, 2001, p. 73). 
A recent Australian investigation conducted by Mills (2005) concluded that attitudes 
regarding prequalification in contractual agreements are mainly dominated by concern for 
past performance rather than worker safety. The top five criteria for public and private sector 
clients combined were, in order, “Details of past projects/track record, Success of completed 
projects, Bank reference, Past project time performance” (Mills, 2005, p.  R85). The criterion 
of “OH&S key personnel” ranked a lowly 32 out of 39 for the combined group.2 Mills’s study 
also contends that contractors and clients (both public and private) generally do not share the 
same views on important selection criteria and the values encompassed by those criteria. Even 
more surprising is that public sector contractors, in the same study, rated “OH&S key 
personnel” more lowly (ranking of 13) as a determinant of tender success than their private 
sector counterparts (ranking of 16). 
 
2.1. Theoretical constructs 
Some theoretical bases for the argument contained herein warrant discussion. The definition 
of public values can be quite broad. Even though different authors writing on this subject use 
similar concepts such as ‘public interests’, ‘public norms’, ‘general interest’, ‘public values’ 
                                                 
2 Separate results for public and private sector clients are not provided, though the responses of 15 public 
sector clients representing 9 agencies were included in the sample. 
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and ‘public objectives’, these terms can all mean very different things (De Bruijn and Dicke, 
2006). Such authors generally argue that the protection of individual public values represents 
costs, and that each public value taken into consideration generally requires a trade-off in 
order to engender overall efficiency (De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006). According to this 
reasoning, if all public values are given equal salience, it would be impossible, in most cases, 
to realize a project in any workable sense. Thus the relative nature of public values means that 
they are often conflictive, i.e., public values always compete with each other and trade-offs 
are necessary (Moore, 1995). These trade-offs are required even when they may be seen as 
inconvenient for some of the different stakeholders involved in the realization process. As De 
Bruijn and Dicke (2006) suggest, these kinds of sacrifices are sometimes perceived as 
necessary, even by those most inconvenienced by these trade-offs in the first place. 
There are three important theoretical approaches with regard to public values. These have 
been elaborated in detail elsewhere (e.g., De Bruijn and Dicke, 2006). A broad summary, 
therefore, will suffice. The first is the universalistic approach, which considers public values 
at an abstract level. The very nature of this approach means that trade-offs are not possible, 
especially since the universalistic approach has an affinity with the natural law perspective, 
which maintains that certain rights are accorded by nature and must therefore be respected 
(Lasswell and McDougal, 1992; Passerin d’Entrèves, 1994). The second approach is the 
stakeholder approach, whereby public values are the result of public debate and stakeholder 
negotiations regarding the conception and realization of a particular project (Van Gestel et al., 
2007). Values may be considered at an abstract level, yet trade-offs between these values are 
necessitated as part of the negotiation process. This means that some public values will lose 
their salience, or else be passed over entirely. The third approach, viz., the insitutional 
approach, holds that public values are not universal, yet neither do they result from 
stakeholder interaction. Rather, perceptions of public values are sector, culture and time 
specific. Likewise, the trade-offs produced will differ according to the sector, the national 
context, or even the historical circumstances on account of actors being embedded in an 
institutional environment that constrains and shapes their behaviours and rationalities (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Ostrom et al., 1990; March and Olsen, 1989; Van Gestel, 2005). 
In light of the above, it would appear that the stakeholder approach best explains what 
has traditionally occurred (and, in many cases, what currently occurs) in construction-industry 
contexts, especially with regard to the public value of worker safety. Indeed, all stakeholders 
in a negotiation process would agree, at an abstract level, that the protection of construction 
workers is of extreme important. This was borne out by qualitative data collected for this 
paper. For example, although it was reported by designers that OHS was traditionally deemed 
“the constructor’s job,” they now increasingly view safety as a consideration: “I’m seeing a 
trend whereby the ability to constantly deliver on the safety aspects of a job is almost a 
requisite for whether you get the rest of it right.” Yet interview data also make the claim that, 
“for the designers, ... the point of view of safety as a public value is not about workers 
directly, but about what it is that the client wants from them.” This point is also illustrated by 
the following from a constructor: “There are two sets of values: one set that the corporate 
guys wrote, someone drafted and then stuck in an annual report; and then there are the real 
values, which aren’t written down anywhere. They are the values you find when you have a 
look into the business.”  
When it comes to operationalizing public values, then, safety may not be given the 
prominence that has been accorded to it in an abstract sense. This is especially so when a 
client’s desire for a reasonable price, timeliness of construction and overall quality are 
matched with a constructor’s desire to maximize returns and thereby ensure ongoing 
profitability (i.e., the “real values”, as explained above). This observation generally coheres 
with Woodward’s reflection (1997) that, on the whole, construction management has 
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generally being influenced by three dominant values, viz., time, cost and quality. Yip (2000) 
adds to this by stating that these values are mainly encouraged by the client, more so since the 
client controls the initial budget and is the one most concerned with the final outcome of the 
construction process. It is for this reason that Coble and Blatter (1999) and the CFMEU 
(2003) contend that the underlying cause of poor OHS in construction is “a culture of cost 
cutting.” The stakeholder approach therefore explains, to some degree, why safety has 
generally failed to matter as much as it should in the designer’s office, or on-site. 
 
2.2. Mechanisms of control 
In order to establish an accurate balance between different public values, De Bruijn and Dicke 
(2006) contend that a combination of three well-known control mechanisms should be 
followed since this has a greater potential to lead to stability among the different public values 
that need to be considered in an infrastructure project.  
The first mechanism described is hierarchy. This refers to realizing public values by 
means of regulations. These can be of either a legal or voluntary nature. Thus the realization 
of public values becomes a norm that must be followed by the main stakeholders. With regard 
to the creation of a voluntary code of practice, such a code could eventually lead to long-term 
legislative change (Helby, 2000). De Bruijn and Dicke (2006) argue that self-regulation can 
be a powerful trade-off for certain values. Helby (2000, p. 4), however, argues that stringent 
regulations may be viewed by stakeholders and indeed practitioners as “unnatural,” especially 
if they compromise the normal dynamic structure of operations. Thus the formulation and 
attempted application of hierarchy in order to impose a public value does not mean that the 
value in question will reach operational levels. This was demonstrated by some of the data 
collected for the project described herein. Indeed, this data suggested that, even in cases 
where construction sites have operationalized their own self-imposed safety regulations, 
individuals may not necessarily follow them. 
The second mechanism is network. This refers to a negotiated agreement being 
established among the different stakeholders involved. Such a process, therefore, seeks to 
establish a mutual understanding and acceptance of a public value. For instance, the creation 
of a voluntary code of practice for OHS in the Australian construction industry is predicated 
on common agreement being established among the main stakeholders. In this case, key 
parties would refer to peak organizations representing the interests of clients, designers and 
constructors, in addition to regulatory bodies, the property sector, the supplier network, the 
education sector, and various professional organizations (Commonwealth of Australia, 1999). 
In this way, it is argued, some kind of workable balance with regard to trade-offs could be 
reached. 
The third mechanism is market. To return to the example of a voluntary code of practice 
for OHS, such a code may not actually affect practice and behaviour on-site. This may be true 
even after integrated negotiation has occurred among the most prominent stakeholders within 
the industry. As a consequence, De Bruijn and Dicke (2006) suggest that competition can be 
used as a motivation for the different stakeholders to work together in order to realize public 
values. Thus market agreements that aim to protect public values may not only be useful with 
respect to establishing OHS as a primary public value, but also have the potential to safeguard 
the value at an operational level. It emerges, therefore, that embracing a public value such as 
worker safety could to lead to a distinctive competitive advantage. That reputational capital 
allows one organization to differentiate itself from competitors is vital to the concept of brand 
positioning (Cooper and Dukart, 1997; Rechenthin, 2004; Tosun, 2004), something which 
could ultimately represent a vital difference in highly competitive sectors such as the 
construction industry (ICAF, 2001). Despite this, constructors interviewed for this research 
were unsure about such theoretical constructs. Indeed, one constructor stated that “If you are 
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really serious about stopping people from getting hurt, it can never be a competitive 
advantage.” 
In sum, a combination of the three control mechanisms discussed supra, viz., hierarchy, 
network and control, has the potential to make the public value of worker safety more salient 
during the conception, detailed planning and realization of major infrastructure. To 
summarize, hierarchy involves regulations that will lead to industry norms, network ensures 
consensus and attempts to achieve balance between trade-offs, while market guarantees that 
providers of infrastructure will compete with each other, not just on the basis of price and 
quality, but also on account of the ability to ensure a safe work-site. Yet, for the latter to 
occur, enhanced worker safety, as an industry value, must be driven by the client. Adherence 
to only one of these mechanisms, it follows, would not bring about the most optimal 
realization of safety as a public value in infrastructure procurement. 
 
2.3. Concretizing public values  
Looking for a balanced trade-off in order to maximize public values is one of the main 
concerns in modern management strategies (Cole and Parston, 2006). According to Cole and 
Parston (2006), one of the principal value drivers is the achievement of high performance. Yet 
high performance, according to the reasoning employed previously in this paper, will 
necessarily mean different things to different stakeholders. Moreover, the ways in which to 
achieve overall high performance will also necessarily differ. Thus the varying ways in which 
organizations involved in project realization attempt to achieve high performance can easily 
lead to trade-offs with regard to specific public values. 
If the organization does not know how to measure or else concretize each of these values, 
this can potentially lead to a lower overall performance in the long term (Cole and Parston, 
2006). Therefore, a cohesive management strategy needs to bear in mind all the outcomes that 
the project aims to achieve, rather than just one single outcome. Trade-offs, of course, always 
entail less than optimum consequences for some of the parties involved in a negotiation 
process. Thus the ideal means to arrive at final decisions would look at all the potential 
outcomes and make sure that every single contributing organization is aware of the nature of 
these outcomes. What is more, all the parties would need to determine if the predicted 
consequences fall beneath their respective thresholds of tolerance. 
 
 
3. Public values and the client 
 
The paper will now examine the notion of the public value of worker safety and differences 
between private and public sector attitudes. This is especially the case since, as described 
above, the provision of many public services, as a result of neo-liberal economic thought 
(Quiggin, 2002), is now undertaken by private sector organizations operating beneath a broad 
regulatory framework imposed by government (Cannadi and Dollery, 2005). Such transferred 
public services, many of which might be defined as “natural monopolies” (Cannadi and 
Dollery, 2005, p. 113), include garbage collection, railways, energy and water supply, and 
airports. Since these public values were once realized by government on behalf of the public, 
that is, before their transfer to the private sector, the public still looks to government to ensure 
that the public values at stake continue to be realized in an equitable, accessible and 
transparent fashion in order to ensure that rent-seeking behaviour on the part of private 
concerns does not infringe upon the public good. Many public values, of course, are realized 
by means of the provision of infrastructure. Some examples include a ready and accessible 
supply of water and energy, in addition to accessible transport infrastructure such as bridges, 
roads, railways and airports. 
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In the following section, data gleaned from interviews of case studies pertaining to OHS 
in the Australian construction industry will be used. Within the construction process three 
main parties are involved, these being the client, designer and constructor. Of concern with 
regard to promoting more integrated approaches to safety is that the traditional methods of 
construction tend to reinforce the division of professions in design and construction, all the 
while removing the client from operational decision-making (Gray et al., 1994). 
 
3.1. Redefining the client’s role in infrastructure provision 
It was found that safety, as a public value, is generally expected to be driven by the 
constructor at an operational level. Indeed, in all the case studies examined as part of the 
broader Safer Construction project of which this research forms a part, leadership, during the 
execution stage of the infrastructure realization process, was always provided by the 
constructor. However, for the designers and constructors, it is clear that the client is the party 
with the potential to make safety a priority from conception through to commissioning. 
According to one designer, “I’d say that clients are a big, big influence. As soon as clients say 
we are not going to give you this job because you haven’t convinced us that you have credible 
safety practices, you either go out of business or you change” (designer). Yet the results of the 
interviews, with regard to the salience of the public value of worker safety on-site, were quite 
variable and sometimes contradictory, all of which demonstrates a lack of clarification about 
worker safety, and again demonstrates a pressing need to concretize this value. 
In general, the interviews support the notion that safety is a significant abstract value 
within the Australian industry. Still, there is a feeling that ‘value’, in the sense of the 
infrastructure being fit for purpose at an appropriate financial cost, is increasingly becoming a 
highly important client desideratum (Ryan et al., 2006). The perspective of the client, 
however, remains ambiguous, at least according to the data collected. Indeed, although clients 
regard safety as an important public value, Australian owners and clients do not feel the need 
to become involved in safety issues on-site, or, what is much worse, at project conception. 
One designer contended that “Safety is at the front, but not at the forefront.” In accord with 
this viewpoint, which is also supported by Mills’s study (2005), the message from the client, 
according to another constructor, is that safety is merely one of many public values to be 
considered, despite the rhetoric that is being increasingly espoused to the contrary: “The 
message in construction is always about getting the job done, whatever you have to do, get the 
job done and ‘by the way do it safely’.” Many constructors, at present, do not even understand 
why a client would want to concern itself with safety in the first place. One constructor even 
asked “What is the value proposition for a client to do that? [i.e., prioritize worker safety].” 
Thus a relatively high degree of apathy still exists among clients procuring infrastructure, 
despite claims that there are good reasons for a client to promote worker safety, such as the 
negative publicity ensuing from death or serious injury on-site, delays resulting from such 
incidents, and liability costs incurred as a result of accidents (Davies and Tomasin, 1996). It is 
readily agreed, however, both by interviewees and the bulk of scholarly literature (e.g., 
Samelson and Levitt, 1982; Hinze and Raboud, 1988; Jaselskis et al., 1996; Bluff, 2003; 
Mills, 2005), that clients have the opportunity to be the main drivers of improving worker 
safety on construction sites. This is an especially relevant consideration for those designers 
who do not yet view worker safety as a particularly important aspect of their brief. Such 
designers continue to ignore the increasing salience of worker safety as a public value, and 
that there is an expectation for this value to be safeguarded by those with the ability to do so. 
Yet, as one designer points out, worker safety too often “gets pushed down and the result is an 
accident on-site.” Designers and constructors are also aware of the difficulties inherent in 
trying to make the clients regard worker safety as a primary value, especially when costs 
could increase if safety for workers is prioritized: “There is no doubt that the costs of 
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accidents in dollar terms ... are three or four million dollars before you blink” (designer). Thus 
clients “need to understand the value that they are getting from these increased costs.” 
Overall, the client represents an important contributing party within the management of a 
construction project (Barnes, 1988; Neap and Aysal, 2004). This is not only because the client 
is the party providing funds for project execution, but also because the client is the party most 
likely to add value to the project and clearly define responsibilities in a contractual sense 
(Samelson and Levitt, 1982). 
 
3.2 Public and private compared 
There are two types of clients to consider, viz., public ones and private ones. The former have 
an obligation to provide some form of service and are thus accountable to society, while the 
latter’s main obligation is to maximize shareholder benefit to the exclusion of other objectives 
(Rowlinson, 1999). Some private clients, of course, desire to become more involved in 
protecting workers on-site, as case study data from the Safer Construction project have 
revealed. However, there is (or so it is reported) considerable resistance within this sector 
regarding the need to be more responsible for worker safety. As one private sector client 
representative put it, “All those people who say the client should be more involved don’t 
understand that the client is going to be less involved, because they have more important 
things to do.” Indeed, some clients fail to see any connection between themselves and 
responsibility for the worker: “Clients cannot be compelled to adopt best OHS practices 
because it is a free market economy.” 
For some clients, value for money will clearly become more important. If a relationship 
between this value and the public value of worker safety becomes more entrenched, this has 
the potential to affect their monetary interests. Such a scenario, it is argued, would force 
presently apathetic clients to become interested in ensuring the salience of worker safety on 
their projects. Thus, for the private sector client to recognize and operationalize safety as a 
primary public value, “There has to be a heavy value statement from a company’s 
shareholders or for those that the client acts for, in order for safety to become a major issue” 
(private sector client). 
On the other hand, governments, as procurers of infrastructure, have rather different 
responsibilities, especially if they are viewed as acting in accordance with public interests, 
and concomitant values. Within this sector, the value of safety need not be so closely tied to 
the concept (and indeed public value) of securing ‘value for money’, at least in a traditional 
sense. For the public sector client, therefore, the rubric of ‘value for money’ can easily be 
expanded in order to accommodate worker safety. For example, that no workers were killed 
or injured during the realization of a public infrastructure project should emerge as a ‘value 
for money’ outcome that delivers the public values of value for money and worker safety: “It 
is easy for government clients to put the safety message across, but private sector clients focus 
on matters that are linked to returns on equity” (private sector client representative). 
Indeed, clients representing the public sector, according to interview data, have a 
different perception of their role in the industry, especially on account of their desire to accept 
safety as an important public value. Such clients are also aware that it is important to be 
involved in the safety process: “That is not to say that everyone in the public service [who] 
gets involved in the construction does [understand their obligations with respect to safety], 
particularly with the decentralization that has occurred in a lot of the jurisdiction” (public 
sector client). The view was also expressed that public sector clients “take OHS extremely 
seriously and have been doing so for many years .... It is something that is re-looked, 
readdressed and reconsidered on a constant basis.”  
The reason that the public sector is keen to accept safety as a primary public value in 
infrastructure procurement seems to be related closely to public opinion, “If there is a death 
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on a government project, politically that is just hideous” (public sector client). If the interview 
data is given credence, the public sector is aware that, as a client of designers and the broader 
construction industry, its influence with regard to worker safety rests on going beyond a 
merely supervisory level. This concurs with research, such as that of Smith and Love (2001), 
suggesting that clients need to become more involved in the general construction process, and 
thereby promote more integrated approaches regarding design and construction (Love et al., 
2000). Public sector clients are also now recognizing that improving designers’ attitudes with 
respect to accepting responsibility for worker safety is contingent on improving their own 
attitudes and behaviour (Coble and Blatter, 1999; Campion, 2000). In addition, clients are 
aware of the influence that they can have on the behaviours and practices of designers and 
constructors. 
In short, it emerges that the developing trend of public sector clients ensuring the safety 
of workers on construction sites may have an important part to play with respect to changing 
attitudes throughout the industry. Thus public sector clients have the ability to set standards 
that the rest of industry will follow. This also relates, by extension, to the way in which clients 
should behave, especially with regard to the extent that they factor in important public values 
into the decision-making process when infrastructure is procured. As one public sector client 
put it, “It is about leading by best practice, but it is more than that. It is leading almost by de 
facto requirement. It is effectively saying, that best practice is the best way to behave, so there 
is an expectation [that other clients] clients will behave that way.” 
Clients in the public sector thus have the opportunity to drive safety as priority; first, by 
establishing it a primarily selection criteria in the contractual process, and then by 
encouraging the private sector to follow their example. 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
This paper has attempted to point a way forward with regard to ensuring that the public value 
of safety is given the salience that it deserves during the realization of public infrastructure. 
As a concomitant, pathways to ensure the increased prominence of worker safety should also 
assist with respect to ensuring that similar traditionally ‘soft’ public values, such as 
sustainability and environmental protection, are given the attention that they deserve and are 
not traded-off during the negotiation phases. More importantly, it has been argued that worker 
safety needs to be operationalized as a value by means of greater concretization, that is, by 
rigorous definition of the concept and incorporation into requested tender documentation. 
The client, it emerges, has the greatest potential to affect change, not necessarily on 
account of ongoing involvement in the realization of infrastructure, but because the client has 
the potential to make optimum worker safety a project deliverable. In this way, worker safety 
forms parts of the overall concept of value. This is especially true for public sector clients 
given that the community does indeed place a high value on the preservation of life and the 
prevention of injury on-site. In these circumstances, the possibility of some added cost is 
balanced by a guarantee of improved safety on-site. Thus best-practice (or indeed leading 
practice) worker safety, specifically defined as such, should be incorporated into contract 
selection criteria and given the same weighting as more traditional public values such as low 
cost, quality and timeliness of completion. In accord with this, worker safety would no longer 
be viewed as an incidental consideration—it would become a core value. 
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